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The ECB’s official inflation objective is an increase in the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices of below 2% in the medium run. Many commentators argue that 
there is a deflationary bias in this definition because the lower bound of the 
inflation objective is not clearly specified. It is also often claimed that the ECB’s 
ambitious inflation objective increases the risk of a liquidity trap and may give 
rise t o higher long-term unemployment because of rigid labour markets in the 
euro area. An assessment of the experience with the ECB’s inflation objective 
over the first four years of EMU reveals that the discussion about the lower bound 
of the ECB’s inflation objective is essentially pointless, because headline inflation 
was barely below two percent. Fears of a liquidity trap or higher unemployment 
also appear not to be supported by the empirical evidence. Another popular 
argument holds that  the common monetary  policy will lead to an increasing 
economic divergence in the euro area because of national inflation differentials 
which translate into national real interest rate differentials. We show that 
aggregate demand in the euro area countries is significantly affected by the euro  
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The creation of a monetary union in Europe on 1 January 1999 is undoubtedly one of the  
largest macro and politico-economic experiments in modern history. It was the cap stone of 
the so-called ‘Maastricht Process’ designed to achieve macro economic convergence, which 
had shaped monetary and fiscal policies in the countries striving for membership in European 
Monetary Union (EMU) over much of the 1990s.
1 The start of EMU was marked by the 
conversion of the national currencies of the member states into euros and the beginning of the 
operations of the new Euro System, the new European Central Bank (ECB) and the national 
central banks of the participating states (NCBs).
2 
 
The Maastricht Treaty provides the institutional framework for the ECB. The Treaty requires 
that the NCBs of all participating states must be politically independent. The ECB is similarly 
independent from the governments of the member states and the political bodies of the 
European Union. The ECB is owned by the NCBs. Monetary policy decisions are made by 
the Governing Council (ECB Council, for short) whose members are the NCB presidents and 
the six members of the ECB Board.
3 Formally, Council decisions are taken by majority vote, 
with each member having one vote and the ECB president a second one in the case of a tie. 
Numerous statements by the ECB president, Wim Duisenberg, indicate that the Council takes 
its decision by consensus or near-consensus rather than simple majority. In most instances, 
the debate seems to continue until a broad consensus is reached about the monetary policy 
proposal presented to the Council. In both aspects, the ECB Council seems to follow the 
practice of the Bundesbank Council in earlier years (von Hagen, 1999). 
 
A significant feature of the Treaty is that it mandates the ECB to regard price stability as the 
principal objective of monetary policy, a heritage from a similar mandate in Germany’s 
                                                 
1 For a review of fiscal policies in the EMU member states during the 1990s see Hughes-
Hallett, Strauch and von Hagen (2001). 
2 In addition to the Euro system, there is also the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), 
which consists of the ECB and the NCBs of the European Union member states. 
3 The president of the European Council and a member of the European Commission have the 
right to participate in ECB Council meetings.     3 
Bundesbank Act. But the Treaty does not define what price stability means in operational 
terms. The independence of the central bank as defined in the Treaty implies that such a 
definition can only be supplied by the ECB itself.  
 
In October 1998, the ECB (1998, 1999) presented its strategy. It is based on a definition of 
price stability, and t wo “Pillars” that form the basis for the assessment of current 
developments and interest-rate decisions. The definition of price stability specifies the 
medium run rate of inflation which the ECB sees as compatible with the mandate to maintain 
price stability as the overriding objective of monetary policy as required by the Maastricht 
treaty. The ECB’s definition of price stability is an annual increase in the Harmonized Index 
of Consumer Prices (HICP), its main gauge of average inflation in the euro area, of below two 
percent. The ECB’s two-pillar strategy comprises a reference value for M3 growth (First 
Pillar) and a ‘’broadly based assessment of the outlook for the future price developments’’ 
(Second Pillar).  
 
Both elements of the ECB’s strategy have been subject of a controversial debate both in 
academic as well as in policy circles. But while the two-pillar strategy was at center stage of 
discussion in the first years of EMU, the ECB’s inflation objective has become the subject of 
increasing controversy more recently. Background of this controversial discussion are 
widespread concerns that the ECB’s inflation objective may be too low given global 
economic developments and persistent inflation differentials in the euro area. In its recent 
revision of its monetary policy strategy, announced on 8 May 2003 (ECB, 2003), the ECB 
explicitly addressed these concerns by clarifying that its inflation objective is to maintain 
inflation rates below but close to 2%, in order to provide a sufficient cushion against the risk 
of deflation and in order to take into account the implication of inflation differentials within 
the euro area.  
 
For the euro area as whole, there is a concern that the low inflation rates the ECB aims at may 
involve an unnecessary risk of deflation and aggravate the euro area’s unemployment 
problem. The worldwide slump in equity prices since March 2000 has triggered fears that the 
whole industrialized world might experience a deflation spiral like Japan did in the 1990s
4. 
                                                 
4 See for example The Economist of 12 October 2002 ‘Of debt, deflation and denial‘.   4 
Following the stock market crash in early 1990, Japan experienced a decade of financial 
fragility, weak economic activity and deflationary developments in goods prices, with 
consumer prices now falling continuously since 1999
5. Other South East Asian countries, 
such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have also experienced asset price deflations followed by a 
marked drop in credit creation and goods price deflation in recent years. By the end of 2002 
the euro area share prices (Euro Stox 50) had fallen by more than 50% from their peak in 
March 2000, so that it is of course easy to draw parallels. Another argument holds that, due to 
the labour market rigidities prevalent in the euro area, the low inflation objective adopted by 
the ECB could cause an increase euro area unemployment. If there is downward nominal 
wage rigidity, low inflation would give rise to downward real wage rigidity and higher 
unemployment. This would imply that that the ECB should adopt a somewhat higher inflation 
objective in order to provide some ‘grease’ for European labour markets.  
 
Despite the introduction of the single currency in January 2002, differentials in national price 
developments continue to exist in the euro area. Persistent inflation differentials are often 
rationalized by the Balassa Samuelson effect. Countries with higher productivity growth in 
the tradable-goods sector should experience higher rates of inflation. Given the economic 
heterogeneity among euro area countries, there is scope for persistent differences in 
productivity growth performances and thus for inflation differentials in the euro area. Since 
all countries face the same short-term nominal interest rate set by the ECB, some critics argue 
that inflation differentials give rise to real interest rate differentials. Countries with lower than 
average inflation would face higher than average real interest rates. The result might be an 
aggravation of disinflationary or even deflationary pressures in countries with already below 
average inflation rates.  
 
In this paper we will assess whether these concerns about the adverse macroeconomic 
implication of low inflation in the euro area are justified. The plan of the paper is as follows. 
Section 2 outlines and discusses the ECB’s inflation objective. Section 3 assesses the area-
wide macroeconomic implications of the ECB’s current inflation objective. Section 4 analyses 
the significance of inflation differentials in the euro area. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
5Other South East Asian countries, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, have also experienced   5 
 
 
2. The ECB’s Inflation Objective 
  
The Maastricht Treaty states that ‘’the primary objective of the ECB shall be to maintain price 
stability’’ (Article 105(1)). The Treaty does not define what price stability means in 
operational terms. The independence of the ECB as defined in the Treaty implies that such a 
definition had to be supplied by the ECB itself. In October 1998 the ECB (ECB, 1998) 
announced that the Eurosystem’s definition of price stability is a year-on year increase in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices of below 2% in the medium run. This definition 
explicitly specified an upper bound of the ECB’s inflation objective, but was tacit about the 
lower bound. In a speech in November 1998, Wim Duisenberg, the ECB President, made 
clear that the Eurosystem’s definition should be interpreted as excluding deflation, implying 
that the ECB’s inflation objective was 0-2% inflation in the HICP.  
 
This definition of the ECB’S inflation objective was not the same as the inflation objective 
implied by the reference value for M3 growth, the key characteristic of the First Pillar. The 
reference value is derived based on a simple velocity equation. The reference value takes the 
growth rate of potential output less an assumed velocity trend as a starting point and adds the 
implicit target inflation rate. In October 1998, the assumed growth rate of potential output was 
2-2.5%, while the assumed trend in velocity was a decline of 0.5-1%. The announced 
reference value, which has remained unchanged since then, was 4.5% (ECB, 1999). The 
implied range of the target inflation rate is therefore 1-2%. This may be due to the fact that 
headline inflation was below 1% at the start of EMU and the ECB wanted to avoid the 
impression of starting monetary union with an inflation rate outside the target range.  
Remarks by the ECB’s chief economist Otmar Issing in a speech in June 2002 in Milan 
suggested that the ECB sees the lower bound of its inflation objective at 1%. In the revision of 
its monetary policy strategy, announced  in a press release on 8 May 2003 (ECB, 2003), the 
ECB clarified that ’’it will aim to maintain inflation rates close to 2% over the medium 
term.’’  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
goods price deflation in recent years.     6 
 
A look at the data suggests that the discussion about the lower bound of the ECB’s inflation 
objective is essentially pointless. Figure 1 displays the development of the year-on-year euro 
area HICP inflation rate, the euro area output gap and the ECB’s main refinancing rate since 
the start of EMU in January 1999 till December 2002. Monthly output gap data were 
generated by linear interpolation from quarterly output gap data, which were calculated as the 
percent gap between real GDP and potential real GDP. Potential GDP was calculated using a 
standard Hodrick-Prescott-Filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 over the period 1970-
2002. The figure reveals that HICP inflation in the euro area was above the upper bound of 
2% since mid 2000 and significantly below the upper bound only in 1999, when average 
inflation was 1%. In the first four years of EMU, the annual euro area HICP inflation rate 
averaged 1.95%. The output gap was slightly negative in the first half of 1999 and turned 
positive in the second half. In the second half of 2001 the output gap turned again negative 
and continued to fall until the end of 2002.  
 
How did the ECB respond to these developments? In May 1999, when HICP inflation was 
around 1% and economic activity showed signs of further weakening, the ECB cut its main 
refinancing rate by half a percentage point to 2.5%. In the second half of 1999 inflation and 
economic activity quickly rebounded, with inflation rising up to 3% in mid 2001. Over the 
same period, the ECB increased interest rates from 2.5 to 4.75%. In the second half of 2001, 
economic activity was weakening while inflation started to recede back towards the upper 
bound of the inflation objective of 2%. This was accompanied by rate cuts of 1.5 percentage 
points. In 2002 inflation hoovered around the 2% upper bound, while the main refinancing 
rate stayed unchanged at 3.25%. In December 2002 the ECB cut interest rates by a further 
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Figure 1 suggests that the main refinancing rate responded more to the output gap than to 
HICP inflation. This may reflect that the ECB tried to conduct policy in a forward looking 
way, since the output gap is often regarded as a leading indicator of inflation. Alternatively, it 
may reflect that the ECB also gives substantial weight to output stabilisation and does not 
only care about inflation. This interpretation is supported by evidence reported by Neumann 
(2002) and Hayo and Hofmann (2003), who find that the weight on the output gap is larger in 
an estimated ECB Taylor rule than in an estimated Bundesbank Taylor rule. Another potential 
explanation is that the ECB cares about core inflation rather than headline inflation. Core 
inflation is measured by excluding food and energy prices from the HICP and is often 
regarded as a better measure of monetary inflation than headline inflation
6.  Figure 2 shows 
that core inflation was at around 1% until the end of 2000 and stays above 2% since mid 
2001. Thus, the development of the core inflation rate can neither explain the series of rate 
increases from November 1999 till October 2000, nor can it explain the rate cuts from May 
                                                 
6 See Wynne (1999) for a review of the concept of core inflation.    8 
2001 till December 2002. This observation is consistent with empirical results reported in 
Begg et al. (2002). Finally, it may also be that the ECB Council pays particular attention to 
economic and price developments in the two largest euro area economies, Germany and 
France, because of their dominant economic and political weight. Figure 2 reveals that 
average inflation in Germany and France was always below euro area inflation since the start 
of EMU. The average German-French inflation rate was below 2%  in most periods and 
averaged 1.45%. This means that the ECB has delivered price stability, in the sense of its own 
definition, rather for Germany and France than for the euro area as a whole. Evidence 
reported by von Hagen and Brückner (2002) support this interpretation. They show that the 
interest rate moves of the ECB can be better described in terms of a Taylor rule for Germany 
and France rather than a Taylor rule for the euro area as a whole.  
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   9 
3. The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation in the Euro Area 
 
The pursuit of price stability as the overriding goal of monetary policy is based on theoretical 
and empirical findings that inflation causes real costs. Friedman (1969) argued that any 
opportunity cost associated with holding money gives rise to inefficient shoe-leather costs 
because households are forced to economise on money holdings
7. Shoe-leather costs are 
minimised when nominal interest rates are zero, implying that there is an optimal rate of 
deflation equal to the level of the real interest rate. This is the famous Friedman rule. Phelps 
(1973) argued that the Friedman rule ignored that inflation is basically a tax on money 
holdings. This public finance approach to optimum inflation suggests that inflation should be 
positive, since an optimal tax system equalises the marginal costs of all taxes. The consensus 
view appears to be that neither a negative nor a positive rate of inflation, but rather price 
stability is the optimal goal for monetary policy
8.  Inflation and deflation both give rise to 
distortions in the relative price mechanism and, as a result, inefficient allocation of resources. 
Furthermore, since tax bases are nominal, positive and negative rates of inflation distort the 
tax system (see, e.g. Feldstein, 1997).  
 
These arguments are the basis of the ECB’s requirement to maintain price stability in the euro 
area formulated in the Treaty. However, in recent years this view has been challenged. For 
example, Svensson (2002) argues that the ECB should aim at an inflation rate of  2%, rather 
than below 2%, in order to have a larger cushion against the zero lower bound of nominal 
interest rates and the risk of a deflationary spiral in the euro area. The main argument is that if 
inflation is very low so are nominal interest rates so that a large negative shock is more likely 
to make the zero-bound on nominal interest rates binding. The risk of getting trapped in a 
deflationary spiral has been analysed in several studies based on shock s imulations in 
calibrated structural models.  By simulating the effect of stochastic shocks similar in 
magnitude to those experienced in the recent past, these studies derive probabilities of a 
binding zero bound on nominal interest rates as a function of the inflation target.  
 
Orphanides and Wieland (1998) simulate a small estimated rational expectations model of the 
US economy, assuming that monetary policy is conducted based on a simple interest rate rule, 
                                                 
7 The shoe-leather cost concept was originally developed by Bailey (1956).    10 
either a Taylor (1993) or a Henderson-McKibbin (1993) rule
9, and that the economy is subject 
to shocks similar in magnitude to those observed for the US over the 1980s and 90s. 
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) simulate stochastic shocks in the Federal Reserve Board’s 
macroeconometric model of the US economy, also assuming that policy rates are set based on 
a simple monetary policy rule. Hunt and Laxton (2002) simulate the Japan block in the IMF 
multi-country macroeconometric model ‘MULTIMOD’ assuming a Taylor rule for interest 
rate policy.  
 
These studies are based on linear rational-expectations models, although the possibility of a 
binding zero bound of nominal interest rates introduces a highly non-linear element into the 
model. Solving the model under the assumption of linearity basically means solving the 
model conditioned on a non-binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The 
possibility of a binding zero bound is therefore not reflected in private sector expectations. 
This means that the model solution becomes increasingly inaccurate the more likely a binding 
zero lower bound becomes. As a result, these models tend to underestimate the probability of 
a bind zero bound. Klaeffling (2002) addresses this issue by adopting a non-linear solution 
method to a small structural model of the economy with a truncated interest rate rule.  The 
model is then solved based on a non-linear solution algorithm factoring in the possibility of a 
binding zero bound in the future into the consumption and pricing decisions of the private 
sector.   
 
Table 1 summarises the results of the studies discussed below. The table reports the estimated 
probabilities of a binding lower bound on nominal interest rates as a function of the inflation 
target. It should be noted that the results are not fully comparable due to different assumptions 
on the level of the steady state real rate of interest. Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and 
Klaeffling (2002) assume a steady state real interest rate of 1%, while Reifschneider and 
Williams (2000) and Hunt and Laxton (2002) assume a steady real return of 2.5 and 2.2% 
respectively. How does the assumed level of the steady state real interest rate affect the 
simulation results? A higher steady state real interest rate is associated with a higher steady 
                                                                                                                                                          
8 For an overview of the various costs of inflation see Fischer (1981) and Romer (2001). 
9 The Taylor rule has a coefficient of one on the inflation rate and of 0.5 on the output gap, 
while the Hederson-McKibbin rule is more aggressive with a coefficient of 2 on the inflation rate and 
one on the output gap.    11 
state nominal interest rate given a specific inflation target. This means that for a given 
distribution of shocks the probability of hitting the zero lower bound will be lower. The 
historical real interest rate appears to be around 2.5%, suggesting that the results of 
Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Klaeffling (2002) slightly overstate the risk if hitting the 
zero bound. The probabilities reported in Table 1 suggest that the risk of hitting the lower 
bound is negligible for inflation rates between 1 and 2 %, which is the range of inflation rates 
observed for the euro area. The simulation results apply to the US and Japan. However, the 
euro area is not fundamentally different in structure from these economies, so that the 
available evidence suggests that with the given inflation objective, there is only a negligible 
risk for the euro area to be driven into a deflationary spiral.  
 
 
Table 1: The probability of hitting the zero bound 
Inflation Target  0  1  2  3  4 
Orphanides and 
Wieland (1998) 
~10  ~2  0  0  0 
Reifschneider and 
Williams (2000) 
14  9  5  1  0 
Hunt and Laxton 
(2002) 
9  2  1  -  - 




Once an economy is caught in a liquidity trap, what can monetary and fiscal policy do to 
escape it? In a recent paper, Buiter (2003) provides an comprehensive overview and 
discussion of the various policy options that have been presented in the literature. Svensson 
(2000) proposed a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate as a ‘foolproof’ way to escape a 
liquidity trap. Buiter shows that this is not necessarily the case. A depreciation may not work 
if the Marshall-Lerner condition is not satisfied and if a country is a net debtor. Also, Buiter 
presents a model where the effect of a depreciation on investment is negative as it reduces 
Tobin’s  q. More promising strategies to escape a liquidity trap are a ‘carry-tax’ on base   12 
money, which would lower the zero bound on nominal interest rates, or a deployment of the 
Friedman helicopter, implemented by issuing base money to finance tax cuts, transfer 
payments or an increase in public spending. 
 
Orphanides and Wieland (1998) show that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates not 
only involves a risk of a deflationary spiral to evolve, but also implies a long-run Phillips 
Curve trade-off for sufficiently low rates of inflation. The rationale behind this result is that 
while monetary policy can always fully stabilise positive shocks, its stabilisation capacity 
with respect to negative shocks is limited by the zero bound for low target rates of inflation. 
This implies a positive relationship between average inflation and average output for 
sufficiently low rates of average inflation. As a result, the long-run Phillips curve is non-
linear, positively sloped for low average rates of inflation and vertical for higher average 
inflation rates. Orphanides and Wieland note, however, that in their model a noticeable long-
run Phillips Curve trade-off only emerges for average inflation rates below two percent and is 
fairly small.  
 
In a highly influential paper, Akerlof et al. (1996) argue that, because of downward stickiness 
in nominal wages, low inflation may come at the cost of a higher long-run average 
unemployment rate. With stable prices, downward stickiness in nominal wages will translate 
into downward stickiness in real wages and, as a result, higher unemployment
10. In this sense, 
inflation ‘‘greases’’ the wheels of the labour market. An empirical implication of this 
argument is that the long-run Phillips-Curve is non-linear: Vertical for high rates of inflation 
and negatively sloped for low rates. The validity of this hypothesis has been tested both at the 
macro level by estimating long-run Phillips Curve trade-offs using aggregate price and 
unemployment data and at the micro level by directly assessing the relevance of downward 
rigidity in nominal wages.  
 
Akerlof et al.  (1996, 2000) simulate a long-run Phillips Curve for the US based on an 
estimated non-linear inflation equation. Inflation is modelled as a function of inflation 
expectations, unemployment and a measure of nominal rigidity, which is formulated as a 
function of the standard deviation of the desired change in wages, the trend growth rate of 
                                                 
10 This argument was originally made by Tobin (1972).   13 
productivity and lagged inflation rates. They find empirical support for their hypothesis that 
downward nominal wage rigidity gives rise to a long-run Phillips Curve trade-off at low rates 
of inflation and conclude that the optimal inflation rate, i.e. the inflation rate that is associated 
with the lowest long-run average unemployment rate, lies in the range of 1.6-3.2% (Akerlof et 
al., 2000, p. 37).  
 
Wyplosz (2001) simulates long-run Phillips-Curves for a sample of industrialised countries 
based on estimated non-linear long-run unemployment equations. Unemployment is modelled 
as a function of Tobin’s q, which he includes following Phelps and Zoega (2000), and a 
polynomial of long-term inflation. Wyplosz finds support for a non-linear shape of the long-
run Phillips Curve, but his results are not consistent across countries. Also, due to 
unavailability of data, he cannot include most determinants of long-term unemployment 
which are suggested by theory, such as the replacement ratio or union coverage
11. The 
estimation results are therefore likely to suffer from omitted variable biases. In his discussion 
of Wyplosz’s paper, Dickens (2001) applies the empirical framework of Akerlof et al. (1996, 
2000) to other non-US industrialised countries and simulates long-run Phillips Curves based 
on the estimation results. It turns out that the different empirical frameworks used by Wyplosz 
on the one side and by Dickens on the other side yield fundamentally different results with 
respect to the shape of the long-run Phillips Curve. To demonstrate this, we show in Figure 3 
long-run Phillips Curves for Germany and France, which we have calculated based on the 
results reported by Wyplosz and Dickens. The graphs reveal that the derived long-run Phillips 
Curves are fundamentally different. Obviously, Dickens’ long-run Phillips Curves are highly 
implausible and not in line with the unemployment-inflation realities in Germany and France.  
The shape of Wyplosz’s long-run Phillips Curves looks more plausible, but his estimates are 
rather imprecise and often not significantly different from the traditional vertical long-run 
Phillips Curve. Also, we tried to estimate specifications of the long-run Phillips Curve similar 




                                                 
11 The various determinants of long-term unemployment are discussed and analysed in depth 
by Layard et al. (1991) and, more recently, by Blanchard (1997, 1998) and Blanchard and Wolfers 
(1999).     14 
 
 
Figure 3: Long-run Phillips Curves  
















































Thus, the evidence on the effect of inflation on long-term unemployment appears to be highly 
inconclusive and unreliable. Also, the studies discussed below are based on sample periods 
where very low rates of inflation were barely observed, so that in fact not sufficient 
observations in the relevant range of inflation are available in order to perform a convincing 
test of the hypothesis of a non-vertical long-run Phillips Curve at low inflation rates.   
 
The evidence from micro data using data on wage settlements lends some support to the 
hypothesis of downward nominal wage rigidity. The evidence is usually based on the 
distribution of nominal wage and salary changes. Most studies find that this distribution is 
asymmetric, with wage cuts being substantially less common than wage increases and a   15 
disproportienately large share of unchanged wages
12. However, Smith (2000) suggests that 
the concentration of nominal wage changes at zero may not necessarily reflect downward 
nominal wage rigidity but may also be due to measurement error and the wide-spread use of 
long-term wage contracts. But even if there is downward nominal wage rigidity, the 
macroeconomic effect of such rigidities has been questioned. Card and Hyslop (1997) and  
Smith (2000) argue that data on wage settlements tend to exaggerate the degree of aggregate 
nominal rigidity and that the macroeconomic effects of the nominal rigidities detected in 




4. Macroeconomic Implications of Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area 
 
Since t he start of EMU in 1999, the persistence of inflation differentials has become an 
increasing reason of concern in policy circles. Since the ECB’s monetary policy is directed at 
inflation in the euro area as a whole, persistent inflation differentials across euro area 
countries will give rise to persistent real interest rate differentials. As a result, the ECB’s 
monetary policy may be overly tight for countries already experiencing low inflation and too 
loose for countries experiencing high inflation rates.  
 
Figure 4 shows average HICP inflation rates in the euro area countries and the euro area in the 
first four years of EMU, 1999-2002. The figures reveal that there is substantial dispersion in 
euro area inflation rates. Compared to the euro area average of 1.95%, inflation was around 
half a percentage point lower in the two largest euro area countries, Germany and France, and 
around 0.3 percentage points lower in Austria. All other countries experienced higher 
inflation rates than the euro area aggregate, e xcept for Belgium, where average inflation 
exactly equals the euro area average. Inflation was lowest in Germany (1.38) and highest in 
Ireland (4.13%), implying a maximum inflation differential of around 3 percentage points. In 
Spain, Greece, Portugal and  the Netherlands, average inflation was around 2 percentage 
points higher than in Germany.  
 
                                                 














































































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Bulletin, various issues, authors’ calculations.. 
 
 
In order to asses how inflation dispersion has evolved since the introduction of the euro we 
report in Figure 5 the development of the standard deviation of the inflation rates in the euro 
area countries over this period. A common argument holds that, due to economic 
convergence, inflation differentials will tend to become smaller in a currency union. The 
graphs reveal that this was not the case in the euro area in the first four years of its existence. 
In 1999 the standard deviation of inflation rates was 0.6 in 1999 and rose to above 1 in 2000 
and 2001. In 2002 it further increased to 1.2. Inflation dispersion in the euro area appears to 
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There are various explanations for persistent inflation differentials in a currency union. 
Inflation differentials may arise in the short-run because of different cyclical positions or 
because of different exposures to exogenous shocks such as oil price increase arising from 
differences in economic structure. Long-run inflation differentials can arise because of 
different productivity trends. The so called Balassa Samuelson effect suggests that differences 
in tradable goods productivity growth will give rise to inflation differentials also in a currency 
union. Perfect competition and mobility of labour between the tradable and the non-tradable 
goods sector implies that there is a common nominal wage for both sectors and that the 
nominal marginal product for each sector must equal the common wage rate: 
N N T T y p w y p = = , where 
T p   and 
N p  are respectively the price of tradables and non-
tradables and 
T y  and  and 
N y  are respectively the real marginal product in the tradables and 
the non-tradables sector. This implies that  
T N N T p p y y D - D = D - D . If productivity is   18 
growing slower in the non-tradables sector, non-tradables prices must rise faster in order to 
equalise nominal marginal products across sectors.   
 
The aggregate price inflation is given by 
N T T T p p p D - + D = D ) 1 ( a a , where 
T a  is the share 
of tradable goods in total consumption. Substituting for 
N p D  we obtain aggregate price 
inflation as a function of tradable goods price inflation and the productivity differential 
between the tradable goods sector and the non-tradable goods sector:  
) )( 1 (
N T T T y y p p D - D - + D = D a . Exploiting the fact that the change in tradable goods prices 
has to be equal across countries and further assuming that the share of tradable goods in 
consumption 
T a  is also equal across countries, the inflation differential between two 










B A y y y y p p D - D - D - D - = D - D a . Thus, 
countries with higher productivity growth in the tradable goods sector relative to the non-
tradable-goods sector will have higher inflation rates, also in a monetary union.  
 
Canzoneri et al. (2001) assess the explanatory power of sectoral productivity trends for the 
development of real exchange rates for a sample of euro area countries over the period 1973-
1991 and find empirical support for the Balasssa-Samuelson hypothesis. They conclude that 
the national inflation differentials that would be implied by the observed productivity 
differentials are rather large. Sinn and Reutter (2001) take the Balassa-Samualson effect as 
their point of departure to assess the likely effect of the common monetary policy on national 
price developments. They find that over the period 1987-1995 the productivity differential 
between tradable and non-tradable goods sector was much smaller in Germany than in the rest 
of the  euro area countries, implying that that in the EMU inflation in Germany will be 
substantially lower than in the other euro area countries. Based on cross-country productivity 
differentials they conclude that euro area inflation must be at least 1% in order to avoid 
deflation in Germany.  
 
Independent of their causes, the existence of persistent inflation differentials in the euro area 
implies persistent differentials in real interest rates across euro area countries. Figure 6 shows 
how national real interest rates, i.e. the three months EURIBOR less national four-quarter 
inflation, compares to the euro area real interest rate, i.e. the three months EURIBOR less   19 
four-quarter euro area inflation, since the start of EMU.  The graphs suggest that real interest 
rates in Germany and France, the two largest euro area economies, were most of the time 
above the euro area real rate, while most other countries had below average real interest rates 
most of the time.  
 
 







































What are the macroeconomic effects of these real interest rate differentials? A popular 
argument holds that countries with a boyant economy and higher than average inflation rates 
enjoy further stimulus by below average real interest rates, while weaker economies with a 
lower than average inflation rates are further weakened by higher than average real interest 
rates. This seems to imply that the common monetary policy will lead to an increasing 
economic divergence in the euro area
13. The ECB will neither be able to dampen increasing 
inflationary pressures in the group of faster growing countries, nor will it be able to fend off 
deflationary developments in the weaker countries.  
 
However, this line of argument disregards two important aspects. First, countries with lower 
than average inflation rates enjoy real depreciations vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area making 
their economies more competitive and thus stimulating net exports. Second, given the large   20 
degree of market integration in the euro area, it may be rather the real interest rate measured 
in euro area prices rather than the real interest rate measured in national prices that matters for 
aggregate demand. Consider a firm’s decision to finance an investment project at a nominal 
rate  t i . The relevant (ex-post) real rate of interest is  t t i p - , where  t p  is the rate of change in 
the firm’s sales prices. The question is, what is the relevant price level for firms in the euro 
area. If firms sell exclusively to their domestic market, the national price level of their home 
country reflects average sales prices. If they sell to all markets in the euro area, applying 
pricing to market, it is the aggregate euro area price level that matters for them.   
 
In order to assess the empirical relevance of real interest rate differentials and relative price 
developments in euro area countries we estimate a simple backward-looking IS Curve of the 
form: 
 



























i t i t y e r y y e b b b a . 
 
where y is the output gap measured as the percent gap between real GDP and potential real 
GDP, calculated using a standard Hodrick-Prescott-Filter with a smoothing parameter of 
1600
14.  r  is the ex-post real interest rate, i.e. the short-term nominal money market interest 
rate less four quarter CPI inflation.  e  is the real effective and 
US y  is the US output gap, 
which was included in order to control for external demand conditions. Data for seasonally 
adjusted real GDP, money market rates and the CPI, which was seasonally adjusted using the 
X-12 procedure  of the US Census Bureau, were taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics. Real effective exchange rates were taken from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators.  
 
Equation 1 was estimated for ten euro area countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Portugal. The equations were estimated 
jointly by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). The sample period is first quarter 1993 till 
                                                                                                                                                          
13 This is a version of the famous ‘’Walters Critique’’ applied to EMU. For a discussion of the 
‘’Walters Critique’’ of the EMS see Miller and Sutherland (1990) and Pill (1996). 
14 The Hodrick-Prescott Filter trend was calculated over the period 1970-2001. The trend 
estimates from other trend filters, such as a bandpass filter, were very similar.    21 
third quarter 2002. The sample period was chosen in order to focus on the period of 
completion of the internal market and the convergence to and completion of European 
Monetary Union. The regression was estimated both for the individual  countries and by 
pooling the observations for the ten countries. The final specification was chosen by a 
general-to-specific modelling strategy, retaining all lags of a variable between the first and 
last lag significant at the 10% level, searching over up to five lags. If no lag was significant at 
least at the 10% level, the lag with the highest t -statistic was retained.  The results are 
reported in Table 2. It turned out that in each regression equation only one lag of each 
explanatory variable was retained. The exception are the Netherlands, were all five lags of the 
real interest rate were retained. We report the estimated coefficients with t -statistics in 
parentheses. For the Dutch real interest rate we report the sum of the coefficients of the 
retained lags and the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the sum the coefficients equals zero.  
 
Table 2: IS Curves for euro area countries, 1993-2002 
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Note: Lags indicates the lags retained for each explanatory variable in the order as the 
variables appear in the columns of the Table. T -statistics are in parentheses. Equations 
estimated by SUR.   22 
The results suggest that the real interest rate is an important determinant of aggregate demand 
in euro area countries coming out significantly in six out of ten countries. The pooled 
regression yields a real interest rate elasticity of 0.5 which is significant at the 1% level. The 
effective real exchange rate is found to be a significant determinant of the output gap only in 
Italy and Portugal. In the other countries the exchange rate elasticities are insignificant, in 
Finland even significant with the wrong sign. This conclusion is reversed by the pooled 
estimator which yields an exchange rate elasticity of 0.25 which is significant at the 1% level. 
The results also suggest that external demand conditions are an important  determinant of euro 
area output gaps. The lagged US output gap is found  to be significant at the 1% level in all 
ten countries.  
 
At a first glance these results appear to imply that real interest rate differentials do matter in 
the euro area. With aggregate demand in the individual euro area countries being significantly 
affected by national real interest rates, real interest rate differentials will give divergent 
economic performances. Or will they? It turns that the answer to this question cannot be given 
based on the standard specification of the IS Curve given by equation 1. The nation real 
interest rate can be written as  ) (
euro euro r r r r - + = , the sum of the real interest rate measured 
in units of euro area goods, i.e. the short-term nominal interest rate less the euro area inflation 
rate, and the difference between the real interest rate measured in units of national goods, i.e. 
the short-term nominal interest rate less the national  inflation rate, and the euro real interest 
rate. Thus, in order to asses whether real interest rate differentials matter we have to estimate 
a slightly revised IS Curve of the form: 
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The results obtained from re-estimating the regression equation with this revised specification 
are reported in Table 3. The results suggest that aggregate demand in the euro area countries 
is determined by the euro real interest rate, while the national real interest rate differentials do 
not appear to have a significant effect on national output gaps. The euro real interest rate 
elasticity is significant at the ten percent level in all countries except for France, Italy and   23 
Austria. The pooled regression yield an elasticity for the euro real interest rate of -0.06 with a 
t-statistic of –4.07. The effect of the national real interest rate differential on the output gap is 
insignificant in all countries, except for Austria, where it is significantly positive. A 
2 c  test 
that the national real interest rate differential coefficients are zero in all countries cannot be 
rejected with a probability value of 0.87. The panel regression also yield an insignificant 
coefficient for the national real interest rate differentials. The effective real exchange rate is 
found to have a significantly positive effect on the output gap only in Italy and Portugal, 
while the pooled regression gives an elasticity for the real exchange rate of 0.25 with a t-
statistic of 3.39. The US output gap remains significant at the 1% level in all tend countries.  
 
 
Table 3: Macroeconomic Effects of Inflation Differentials in the Euro Area 
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Note: Lags indicates the lags retained for each explanatory variable in the order as the 
variables appear in the columns of the Table. T -statistics are in parentheses. Equations 
estimated by SUR. 




The ECB’s official inflation objective is an increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices of below 2% in the medium run. Many commentators argue that there is a deflationary 
bias in this definition of the inflation objective because the lower bound of the inflation 
objective is not clearly specified and that the low inflation objective increases the risk of a 
liquidity trap and may give rise to higher long-term unemployment because of rigid labour in 
the euro area. An assessment of the experience with the ECB’s inflation objective over the 
first four years of EMU reveals that the  discussion about the lower bound of the ECB’s 
inflation objective is essentially  pointless, because headline inflation was barely below two 
percent. This observation is consistent with the ECB’s recent monetary policy revision, where 
it was clarified that the ECB aims at an inflation rate below but close to 2% (ECB, 2003).  
 
Fears of a liquidity trap or higher unemployment because of low inflation in the euro area also 
appear not to be supported by the empirical evidence. The empirical evidence on the liquidity 
trap  suggests that the risk of hitting the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates is 
negligible for medium run inflation rates between 1 and 2 %, which is the range of inflation 
rates observed for the euro area. The evidence on the effect of inflation on long-term 
unemployment appears to be highly dependent on the chosen modelling strategy and must 
therefore be deemed to be inconclusive and unreliable. 
 
A popular argument also holds that the common monetary policy will lead to an increasing 
economic divergence in the euro area because of national inflation differentials which 
translate into national real interest rate differentials. Countries with a boyant economy and 
higher than average inflation rates enjoy further stimulus by below average real interest rates, 
while weaker economies with a lower than average inflation rates are further weakened by 
higher than average real interest rates. We argue that, given the large degree of market 
integration in the euro area, it may be rather the real interest rate measured in euro area prices 
than the real interest rate measured in national prices that matters for aggregate demand. In 
order to assess the empirical relevance of real interest rate differentials and relative price 
developments in the euro area countries we estimate simple backward-looking IS Curves for   25 
ten euro area countries.  We show that aggregate demand in the euro area countries is 
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